Mr. President, the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

and ballistic missile delivery

systems continues to be one of the

most significant threats to America’s

national security. States like North

Korea and Iran are actively pursuing

ambitious programs and the technology

needed to threaten the United

States. Unclassified reports from our

intelligence agencies indicate that

these efforts have intensified.

Iranian ballistic missile progress is

largely the result of substantial assistance

from North Korea, China, and especially,

Russia. There is no doubt that

foreign technology and assistance are

essential to Iran’s ballistic missile and

weapons of mass destruction programs.

The U.S. intelligence community’s

most recent unclassified Semiannual

Report to Congress on Proliferation

states, ‘‘Iran remains one of the most

active countries seeking to acquire

WMD [weapons of mass destruction]

and ACW [advanced conventional weapons]

technology from abroad.’’

The type of foreign assistance that is

the subject of this legislation serves to

increase the sophistication and rate of

development of Iran’s ballistic missiles.

We must do more than we are

doing now to impede its progress and,

at the same time, prepare defenses

against the use of such weapons.

The rapid development of the

Shahab-3 demonstrates how foreign assistance

accelerated Iran’s ballistic

missile programs. The Shahab-3 is

based on the North Korean Nodong ballistic

missile. But instead of simply

purchasing the missile as Pakistan did,

Iran chose to modify the design of the

missile with Russian and Chinese assistance

and produce the missile on its

own. In February 1997, George Tenet,

then Acting Director of the CIA, testified

that with North Korean assistance,

Iran could develop the Shahab-3 medium-

range ballistic missile, ‘‘in less

than ten years.’’ Less than a year later,

in January 1998, Director Tenet testified,

‘‘Iran’s success in gaining technology

and material from Russian companies,

combined with recent indigenous

Iranian advances, means that

[Iran] could have a medium-range ballistic

missile much sooner than I assessed

last year.’’ Six months later, in

July 1998, Iran flight-tested the

Shahab-3. An unclassified Intelligence

Community report released in January

of this year assessed that Iran has

achieved an ‘‘emergency operational

capability’’ with the Shahab-3.

Proliferation to Iran continues. According

to the U.S. intelligence community’s

most recent unclassified

Semiannual Report on Proliferation,

summarizing proliferation that occurred

in the first half of 1999,

This report to Congress also states,

‘‘. . . economic conditions in Russia

continued to deteriorate, putting more

pressure on Russian entities to circumvent

export controls. Despite some

examples of restraint, Russian businesses

continue to be major suppliers

of WMD equipment, materials, and

technology to Iran.’’

Because Russian government officials

continue to show an unwillingness

or inability to stop this dangerous

assistance to Iran, the legislation we

are considering should be passed to authorize

and direct more effective sanctions.

North Korea’s continuing relationship

with Iran is also of great concern.

Iran has already received sufficient

technology from North Korea to build

a copycat three-stage Taepo Dong-1

ballistic missile on its own. Moreover,

senior Intelligence Community officials

have testified that they expect

North Korea to continue to sell ballistic

missiles to Iran. Therefore, we

must expect Iran to acquire the technology

for the longer-range Taepo

Dong-2 ballistic missile when North

Korea begins its export. It is too optimistic,

given the North Korea-Iran ballistic

missile relationship, to expect

Iran’s capabilities to lag North Korea’s

for very long.

There are several significant consequences

of the continued proliferation

of ballistic missile technology to

Iran. I’ll mention two.

First, this assistance will allow Iran

to develop more advanced ballistic missiles

faster, cheaper, and easier than it

otherwise would have on its own. Iran’s

defense minister has announced that it

is working on the more advanced

Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 missiles, and

the Iranians even claim that they are

going to launch a satellite into orbit

by the second half of 2001. According to

press reports, Iran’s Shahab-4 and

Shahab-5 ballistic missiles will use

Russian engine technology, leading to

an Iranian ICBM based in large part on

Russian technology. Diminishing this

proliferation is essential to slowing

Iran’s long-range ballistic missile program.

Second, Iran is bound to become a

supplier of ballistic missile technology

and expertise as its own program proceeds.

CIA Director Tenet recently

made this point, testifying that,

‘‘Iran’s existence as a secondary supplier

of this technology to other countries

is the trend that worries me the

most.’’ We are already seeing indications

that Iran is no longer merely a

recipient of ballistic missile technology.

According to unclassified intelligence

community reports, Iran is assisting

Libya’s ballistic missile programs.

Press reports also indicate Iran

is helping Syria and others develop or

acquire ballistic missiles.

The legislation before the Senate will

improve our efforts to restrain the proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction

and ballistic missile technology to

Iran. I urge its approval.